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In Evangelium Vitae, number 65 , Pope John Paul II deals with the morality
of using painkillers in the final stages of illness, which could involve the
risk of shortening life. His solution is one that is found in previous
teaching of the Magisterium and in the writings of Catholic moralists
generally. The shortening of life for the dying person, if it were to happen ,
would not be intended but would be the side-effect of the intended action ,
which is pain relief. There would be a proportionate reason for the
shortening of life, again , the relief of pain . If serious pain can be relieved
only through permanent loss of lucidity, then the person should have taken
care of his or her religious, moral , family and social obligations prior to the
administration of the medicine. This seems to us so clear and evidently
correct that it needs no further commentary. I
Within this same section, however, the Pope makes a statement which
gives rise to two question s. He writes:
While praise may be due to the person who voluntarily
accepts suffering by foregoing treatment with painkillers in
order to remain fully lucid and, if a believer, to share
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consciously in the Lord' s Passion, such "heroic" behaviour
cannot be considered the duty of everyone. (Quotation
marks in the original)

The two questions are the following . First, if abstaining from painkillers is
"heroic", in what sense is it not a duty of everyone? Martyrdom is heroic,
after all, and this is considered a duty of everyone, should the
circumstances arise. Second, in what sense is "voluntarily accepting
suffering ... to share consciously in the Lord ' s Passion" a virtue? Is pain, as
such, valuable?

Duty Free Heroism
The encyclical has nine references to heroism, but this is the only
occasion where there are quotation marks around the word "heroic". Why
this is so remains open to conjecture . What we want to know is why
exactly does the Pope not consider the foregoing of painkillers an
achievable ideal. By achievable ideal we would mean something that is
actually achieved by some people and is behavior expected of all people.
An example would be perfect chastity within or without matrimony. This
is, in fact, "a duty of everyone." Whether achieving perfect chastity is
heroic behavior we leave for the moment. There is no question that
embracing martyrdom is heroic and this, too, is an achievable ideal, with
the added condition "should the occasion arise." If a person were not to
achieve this ideal , then there mayor may not be culpability involved, either
in the non-achievement itself or because a previous lifetime had not
responded to virtue sufficiently well to enable the choice here and now.
What is clear is that the foregoing of painkillers, according to Evangelium
Vitae, does not fall into the achievable ideal category.
Is it possible that the foregoing of painkillers is a " work of
supererogation", and thereby "cannot be considered the duty of everyone?"
A so-called work of supererogation would be one that is possible here and
now for an individual and is morally better than available alternatives, but
which is not required of a person. It echoes the "beyond the call of duty"
evaluation by secular society of deeds of bravery of some sort or another.
However, supererogation seems to clash with a Christian understanding of
love. When is there a level of love of God or neighbor which, when
attained, would leave people free of further obligation and above which
people would enter the realm of free choice? Supererogation has a putative
respectability in a moral understanding imprisoned by legalism and
minimal ism . Its fraudulent claims are exposed in a moral world of loving
relationship where virtue displaces law as the dominant concept. It would

74

Linacre Quarterly

seem, then, that supererogation is not the answer to " cannot be considered
the duty of everyone."
Pope Pius XII is enlightening on this point in two allocutions in 1957
and 1958? He speaks about the possible heroism of those who eschew the
use of painkillers at the end of life. But pain, he says, is not an
indispensable condition for loving God fully .
The acceptance of physical suffering is only one way,
among many others, of indicating what is the real essential:
the will to love God and serve Him in all things. It is,
above all , in the perfection of this voluntary disposition that
3
the quality of the Christian life and its heroism consists.

The relief of pain is conformed to the spirit of the Gospel, and doctors who
use their skill in this regard participate in a divine work. (Documentation
Catholique, 1958, column 1233) Indeed, the relief of pain often makes
prayer possible and the gift of self to God more intentional. (D.C., 1957,
338) The great strides that have been made in pain control in the forty
years since the Pope spoke, which permit pain relief without interfering
with lucidity, strengthen thi s last point made by Pius XII.
The teaching of both Evangelium Vitae and Declaration on
Euthanasia (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1980) does not
state explicitly that there are ways other than the voluntary embracing of
unnecessary pain which lead towards the perfection of love. However, this
would seem to be the position of both documents. The Declaration says:
Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to impose a heroic way
of acting as a general rule. On the contrary, human and
Christian prudence suggest for the majority of sick people
the use of medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing
pain, even though these may cause as a secondary effect
semi-consciousness and reduced lucidity . (section III)

It would seem that prudence is the virtue which would determine which
way towards perfect love is most appropriate for a particular individual.
The way of voluntary, unnecessary suffering is not the way for most
people . Evangelium Vitae makes most sense when it is interpreted in the
same light.
Earlier we spoke about martyrdom as an heroic action which is
demanded of people generally, if the circumstances were to arise. At this
point we would deny any analogy to the choice of pain and suffering.
There is no way of avoiding the choice between an affirmation of one' s
faith and its denial. Martyrs are not faced with other possible answers to
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their dilemma. It is, in fact, a ratification or denial of their fundamental
option for or against God. Since the action is heroic, there may be many
people who, in the face of torture and death , lack the depth of virtue to
choose the right way. There may, indeed, be no culpability in the wrong
choice. The fact remains, though , that there is no third choice which comes
between an affirmation of God and a denial of God.
What about the living out of perfect chastity? We suggest here that
this is not heroic in the strict sense, if we mean by this the avoidance of
sexual immorality. With the help of grace and in prayer, it is perfectly
possible for people to embrace a chaste way of life. The living out of this
virtue may be heroic in particular circumstances, of course, and those
circumstances may be quite widespread in the Western world. Again, it is
not a question of culpability. It is a question of obeying a negative
absolute. It is immoral to kill innocent human persons (negative absolute),
but this says little about the myriad ways the dignity of each person can be
upheld and furthered.
Likewise, the avoidance of sexual immorality
involves a negative absolute, but this says little about the ways of chastity.
Face to face with a negative absolute, there is no third way between
choosing immoral behavior or rejecting the temptation .

Finding the Virtue
The Document has this to say about suffering:
According to Christian teaching, however, suffering
especially suffering during the last moments of life, has a
special place in God's saving plan ; it is in fact a sharing in
Christ's passion and a union with the redeeming sacrifice
which He offered in obedience to the Father's will.
Therefore, one must not be surprised if some Christians
prefer to moderate their use of painkillers, in order to
accept voluntarily at least part of their sufferings and thus
associate themselves in a conscious way with the sufferings
of Christ crucified (cf. Mt. 27:34). (Section II I)

As we have seen above, Evangelium Vitae also has praise for those who
voluntarily accept suffering by foregoing painkilling treatment in order to
remain fully lucid and, if a believer, to share consciously in the Lord's
Passion. Pius XII is equally explicit about the heroic nature of choosing
pain (i.e., not avoiding it when this is simple) in order to be united with the
suffering of Christ. Is God appeased by suffering as such, either the
suffering of Christ, the Son of God, or the freely chosen suffering of dying
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Christians who want to be united with Christ's suffering? That seems quite
blasphemous.
What is at stake in Christ's case is the at-oneness with the Father, His
total obedience to the Father's will and His self-emptying love for human
persons. If His life and teaching spent in total love of the Father were to
lead to His own suffering and death, so be it, if this is the price of perfect
love. The Christian who suffers at the end of life despite all attempts to
alleviate pain can follow Christ intimately in submitting himself or herself
to the love of the Father amid the mystery of evil. He or she knows that the
Savior, too, suffered, not for an instant cut adrift from perfect love, but
without the consolation of perfect understanding. When it is a case of
choosing to suffer, then it makes sense to think that suffering may be the
price to be paid for the lucidity to love God and people. At this time, the
suffering can be consciously associated with the suffering of Christ, Who
Himself paid a price for love. It is also understandable that some of our
Christian brothers and sisters who have a deep spirituality might want to
experience suffering in order to have a privileged insight into the cost of
our redemption and the depth of divine love which achieved it. And finally
some who have a deep sense of solidarity with the poor may want to
experience only what is available to the least of our brothers and sisters,
many of whom have no access to painkillers. What is not at stake,
however, is the value of suffering as such; God is no sadist.

Conclusion
The Popes refer to the practice of voluntary, unnecessary suffering in
union with Christ as having traditional value. We have seen some of the
ways in which that tradition makes perfect sense to the Christian of deep
faith. It remains true, however, that not all are called to such sacrifice. In
light of the papal and congregational teachings, each person should judge
whether the use of painkillers is the better choice in his or her case, the
choice which draws him or her into deeper love of God. What is proposed
as "heroic" in Evangelium Vitae is not the better moral way for a ll. For
some, the best way will be in refusing all kinds of pain relief, if their
motives are clear and if they are strong enough in themselves . For others,
who could not function (even spiritually) without painkillers, the prudent
response will be to accept the offer of painkillers in order that they might
better respond in love to God and family and friends .
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